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1959] RECENT DECISIONS 781 
TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INCIDENCE OF TAX DETERMINED BY 
TESTAMENTARY DIRECTIVE-An inter vivas trust created by testator and 
property held jointly with his wife were included in his gross estate 
in computing the federal estate tax.1 Testator left his residuary estate to 
charity and directed in his will that the estate tax on the above inter vivas 
transfers be borne by the property so transferred. The government de-
termined that the estate tax was payable out of the residue and reduced 
the charitable deduction2 by the amount of the estate tax attributable to 
the inter vivas transfers pursuant to section 812(d) of the 1939 Internal 
Revenue Code.3 The district court granted the executor a refund, deciding 
that the tax on the inter vivas transfers was payable out of that property 
as the testator directed.4 On appeal, held, affirmed. Under Minnesota law 
the estate tax falls on the residue unless the testator, as here, indicates 
it is to fall on other property. United States v. Goodson, (8th Cir. 1958) 
253 F. (2d) 900. 
State law, not federal law, determines the incidence of the federal 
estate tax;5 and at common law two rules vie for favor-the residue 
rule and the apportionment rule. The residue rule, deemed the majority 
view,6 is that absent a contrary testamentary direction the tax is paid by 
testator's residuary estate.7 Bases for the rule are that the testator's silence 
indicates his intent to rest the tax on the residue,8 its function being to 
discharge the estate's debts,9 and that specific legacies indicate testamentary 
intent that the legatees get their designated amounts without reduction 
1 I.R.C., §§2035-2038 and 2040 include in decedent's gross estate transfers made in 
contemplation of death, transfers -with a retained life estate, transfers taking effect at 
death, revocable transfers, and property held jointly by decedent with another. The court 
did not indicate which of the sections were applicable in the principal case. 
2 I.R.C., §2055(a) provides for deduction of bequests to charitable uses. 
3 Now I.R.C., §2055(c), which reduces the charitable deduction ,by the amount of 
the tax which, by either (1) the terms of the will or (2) the law of the jurisdiction, is 
payable out of the charitable bequest. 
4 Goodson v. United States, (D.C. Minn. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 416. 
5 Riggs v. Del Drego, 317 U.S. 95 (1942). 
6 Principal case at 902-903. See also Sutter, "Apportionment of the Federal Estate 
Tax in the Absence of Statute or an Expression of Intention," 51 MICH. L. REv. 53 at 53 
(1952); Fleming, "Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes," 43 ILL. L. REv. 153 at 159 
(1948). 
7 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 A. 786 (1938); Young 
Men's Christian Association v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924); Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 
131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 
(1919); Matter of Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919), cert. den. 250 U.S. 672 (1919). 
s See Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis, note 7 supra, at 51; Bemis v. 
Converse, note 7 supra, at 134. 
9 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Dartmouth College, note 7 supra, at 474; Plunkett v. Old 
Colony Trust Co., note 7 supra, at 475-476. See also Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290 at 
295, 33 A. (2d) 206 (1943). 
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for taxes.10 The judicial response of some courts to the residue rule was 
the development of the apportionment rule. Under this rule, absent a con-
trary testamentary direction, the tax is apportioned to the respective prop-
erties from which it arises.11 In many states this rule has been established 
by apportionment statutes.12 Apportionment saves the residue from oblit-
eration or depletion by the tax,18 thus protecting the residuary legatees, 
who are often the testator's dependents.14 Each of the rules supposedly 
permits a testator to direct that the tax shall fall as he wishes.15 
Testators often direct that certain portions of the testamentary estate 
s:hall bear the estate tax burden.16 The principal case is one of the few in 
which a testator has attempted in his will to burden non-testamentary 
property with a portion of the estate tax and a court, without the aid 
of statute, has allowed him to do so.17 That a testator could reach 
back in time, and years after a fully completed, unconditional, inter 
vivos transfer, command that his transferees pay an estate tax seems a 
startling proposition.18 It squarely contradicts the general principle 
recognized in this case that " ... once a party has disposed of his property 
10 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Dartmouth College, note 7 supra, at 473-474; In re Cole's 
Estate, (Ohio 1952) 111 N.E. (2d) 35. 
11 In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112 at 125-126, 255 P. (2d) 317 (1953); Industrial 
Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 76 A. (2d) 600 (1950). 
12 See, e.g., Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1953) §970; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) tit. 3A:25-30 
to tit. 3A:25-38; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §124, 1958 Pocket Part 145. 
Objections to the apportionment statutes have been that they breed administrative diffi-
culties and interpretative litigation. 30 IND. L. J. 217 at 237-238 (1955); Mitnick, "State 
Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax," 10 Mn. L. REv. 289 (1949). But 
most new statutes' meanings become settled after a time. 19 CONN. B. J. 6 at 17 (1945). 
Because they tax completed inter vivos transfers, their unconstitutionality has also been 
urged, ·but the statutes have usually been -upheld. See, e.g., In re Ryle's Estate, 170 Misc. 
450 at 453-454, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 597 (1939); Matter of Scott, 158 Misc. 481 (1936), affd. In 
re Scott's Will, 249 App. Div. 542, 293 N.Y.S. 126 (1937), affd. per curiam Matter of Scott, 
274 N.Y. 538, 10 N.E. (2d) 538 (1937). 
18 See, e.g., Jeffery's Estate, 32 Pa. D. & C. 5 (1938), affd. Jeffery's Estate, 333 Pa. 15, 
3 A. (2d) 393 (1939). There the total tax on the gross estate, including certain inter vivos 
trusts, was $4,000 compared with a testamentary estate of $2,000. 
14 Sheffield, "Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes-A Con-
sideration of Lhe New York Statute," 19 CoNN. B. J. 6 at 15 (1945); 30 IND. L. J. 217 at 
228 (1955); 4 INTRA. L. REv. 121 (1949). 
' 16 Principal case at 903; Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., note 7 supra, at 475-476; 
In re Gallagher's Will, note 11 supra, at 126; and see statutes cited note 12 supra. 
16 37 AL.R. (2d) 13 (1954) and cases .there cited; 15 AL,R. (2d) 1216 at 1224 (1951) 
and cases there cited. 
17 The court's decision was based on its interpretation of applicable Minnesota law. 
Recent cases giving effect to such a testamentary direction pursuant to an apportionment 
statute are Matter of Slade, 4 Misc. (2d) 616, 158 N.Y.S. (2d) 719 (1956) and Matter of 
Ruth, 206 Misc. 423, 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 650 (1954). 
18 Other writers have noted the dearth of decisions on such a testamentary directive 
but have thought it sustainable. See Fleming, "Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes," 
43 !LL. L. REv. 153 at 167-168 (1948); Karch, "The Apportionment of Death Taxes,'' 54 
HARV. L. REv. 10 at 36-45 (1940). 
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without reservation he can subsequently exercise no control over such 
property."19 There thus appears to be no basis in property law for the 
assertion of the principal case that it is "not unreasonable" to allow 
the testator to burden such property with its estate tax.20 Moreover, the 
possibility that a subsequent testamentary directive may burden an inter 
vivos grantee's property with its estate tax makes uncertain the quantum 
of the gift. But counterbalanced against these problems are those arising 
from failure to allow the testator to direct the tax burden. An unvarying 
application of the apportionment rule would eliminate uncertainty, but 
it might also create harmful inflexibility by depleting specific legacies 
which the testator may want to pass undiminished.21 The damage from a 
uniform application of the residue rule is even greater when the residuary 
legatees are the testator's dependents.22 The court could have alleviated 
this inflexibility while being consistent with property notions by indi-
cating that a testamentary directive would be permissible if the testator 
at the time of the inter vivos transfer had informed his grantee that his 
property was subject to the burden of a portion of the estate tax if the 
testator later so willed. The testator would then have effectively reserved 
some control over the property. But the court did not make any dis-
tinction between revocable and irrevocable transfers.23 Instead it chose to 
allow unbounded testamentary freedom, with perhaps some justification. 
Since the testator has legal control over some types of non-testamentary 
property-e.g., revocable trusts-he can as a practical matter always make 
such property bear its tax.24 As to non-testamentary property over which 
the testator has retained no control-e.g., a gift in contemplation of 
death-the very fact that it was included in his taxable estate affords some 
basis for the testator's burdening it with a portion of the estate tax. Inter 
vivos transfers which are substitutes for testamentary transfers are in-
cluded and taxed "as if" they were testamentary.25 A testamentary direc-
tive, furthermore, does no more damage to traditional property concepts 
than does an apportionment rule or statute. The directive in the principal 
case operated, like apportionment, to protect the residuary legatees. But 
the directive left specific legacies untouched, whereas apportionment would 
19 Principal case at 905. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Sheffield, "Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes-A Con-
sideration of the New York Statute," 19 CONN. B. J. 6 at 15 (1945). 
22 See note 14 supra. 
23 The appellate record shows that the trust in the principal case was irrevocable. 
But the testator retained considerable control over the corpus, inasmuch as he was both 
a trustee and a beneficiary and had the reserved power, together with the other benefi• 
ciaries, to distribute the trust property among them. 
24 The testator could revoke the trust, bequeath the corpus to the beneficiary, and 
make the corpus bear its tax. 
25 Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176 (1938). 
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have depleted them. Thus the directive is less abusive to willed property 
than apportionment, embracing its benefit but not its fault. 
The principal case does suggest an unfortunate possibility. It could 
arguably be used as authority for a testator to direct that his inter vivos 
transferees should bear the entire estate tax. A vindictive testator might 
take advantage of such a rule to destroy his inter vivos transfers by taxa-
tion. Probably such a decision would go too far. Although there is 
nothing in the court's reasoning in the principal case to indicate a valid 
basis for so limiting the testator's discretion, perhaps even this court 
would not allow a testator to burden the inter vivos property beyond 
its proportionate share of the tax. 
Robert A. Smith 
